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^Abstrac+ln this paper, we introduce background lmowledge
of wireless ad hoc networkin mobile od hoc network (MANEI) as
well as idrusion daeaion sptems eDS) and nobile ogents. T:his
research sfudy surveys, studies and compares the existing
intrusion detection based on mobile agent for mobile ad hoi
networks. Based on our best knowledge from previous researches
we design distributed hierarchical /D^S inclusive of network-based
and host-based intrusion detection system with due consideration
to their characteristics on ad hoc on4emand distance vec.lor
routing protocol (AADV+). In addition, distributed hierarchical
IDS model consists of two layers, cluster member layer and
cluster head layer. Designing distributed hierarchical IDS is the
main part of our methodologr, where we try to show some
improvement for ideal and accurate IDS for wireless ad hoc
network We propme some enhancement based on the
characteristics and measure the efficiency of IDS in terrn of
accuracy and detection rate and CpU asage.
Index--Ail Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV+),
Distributed Hierarchical IDS, Mobile Ad Hoc Network(MAltET), Mobile Agent and Network Simutator (NS2).
I. INrnoouctrol
\f,/ireless local area network (WLAN) was introduced
Y Y around 1980, andjust in fewpast years, wireless adhoc
networks have received significant attention because oftheir
unique facilities []. Wireless ad hoc network applicatims are
Network (WSN). In ttris study we focus more on MANET due
to their mobility and their minimal resourc€ requirement.
MANET has unique characteristics like mobility, scalability,
self-organizing, dynamic network topology, decentralized
network contol, low-power and resource-limited operation
etc. These characteristics make MANET more wlnerable to
sevsral types ofattacks and physical security threats than fixed
wired nefworks. These properties intoduce several problems
relating to security of ad hoc networh which is a complex task.
Therefore, securing wireless ad hoc networks is a highly
challenging issue.
The main problem of this research is how to design a good
and ideal infrusion detection system (IDS) that could cover the
effective IDS requirements especially accwacy to enplore the
development of security in a MANET. Although an
autonomous, stand-alone MANET is useful in many cases, a
MANET connected to the Internet is much mce desirable.
This interconnection is achieved by using an extended routing
protocol called AODV+ [3]. So the main scope of our work is
new design and implement of efficient disfiibution of mobile
agarts with specific IDS tasks according to their functionality
over a MAMT that has connection to the Internet by AODV+,
and shrdy the effect of the proposed IDS.
II. IxrnusroN DsrpcrroN Sysreu
A. Intrusion Detection System Definition
IDS can be defined as the guard system that automatically
detects malicious activities within a host or a network, and
consequently generates an alarm to alfi the security apparatus
at a location if intrusiors are considered to be illegal on that
host or network.
B. Intrusion Detection System Classifrcation
There me several ways to categortze an IDS. In many simple
IDS implementation, several categories are combined in a
single device. Particularly, we described two main IDS
classification. First category is based on the technique of
intrusion detection and analysis strategy, which have two main
tlpes and one hybrid model. These three broad categories of
IDS can be used on host-based and network-based IDS
systems.
1 ) Anomaly-Based Detection
2) Signanre-Bas ed Detection (Misuse Detecfion)
3) SpeciJication-Based Detection Qlybrid Detection)
becoming more popular wtrere wired networking is
available or wiring not economically feasible.
improvement of wireless ad hoc network applications and
mobile devices, security becomes one of the main problems,
which ad hoc networks confront nowadays. Just like any other
network, ad hoc networks expedence common security
vulnerabilities that cause attacks such as denial of seryice
attack, intruding spoofing, eavesdropping and signal jamming.
Furthermore, preservatiur of securif, reliability, intertionaljamming and latency are considerable in a wireless ad hoc
network [2]. So there are some motivations to improve security
in ad hoc networks (by using some intrusion prevention and
detection techniques) that caused us to carry out this research
study.
In general, a wireless ad hoc network divides into two qpes:
Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) and Wireless Sensor
not
with
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Second category is bsed on data collection mechanism and
monitoring activity, either on single-host or on multiple-host
within network:
1) Network-based IDS Q{IDS)
2) Host-based IDS (HIDS)
Generally, NIDS uses Signanre-based detection and HIDS
uses Anomaly-based detection. Each approach has its shanglhs
and weaknesses; each is complanurtary to the other. A
successful IDS will employ both technologies (HIDS and
NIDS). In Table I, we compare MDS and HIDS in case of
their sfrengths and weaknesses to demonstate how the two can
work togetho to provide additional effective intrusion
detection and protection.
C. Intrusion Detection System Requirenents
Some papers t4l-t161 suggested IDS, which is one of the
best solutions instead of intrusion protection against intuders
(especially internal intruders) on MANET. The traditional way
(firewall and cryptography) are design for known attacks and
also each of these techniques comes with overhead and
complexity. Unlike firewall that is the first line of defense and
monitors border nodes to detect the external attacks, IDS
appetrs just after an intrusion has happened and a node or
network has been compromised. On ttre other hand inffusion
detection monitors internal attacks as well as external attacks;
that is why IDS is called as the second line of defense.
So far a few researches have been done in IDS for
faditional fixed wired networks. However, appllng the
research of wired networks to wireless networks is not easy
tasks. The efficiency of IDS solution that were designed for
fixed wired networks are also limited for wireless ad hoc
networks because of some special properties of wireless adhoc
networks. To overcome the problem we need to develop a
systematic approach for designing the realistic IDS for
MANET. Based on these aims the specialized MANET IDS is
expected to support several of the following requirements [5]:
o An IDS should not introduce any weakness and overhead
in the MANET.
o An IDS addition of detection should have a proper
response.
o An IDS should itself be fault-tolerant and resistant to
attacks, especially denial-of-service attacks.
r An IDS should use as little system resources as possible
to detect and prevent intrusions.
r High accuracy ofthe IDS.
III. RELATEDWONT
In this sectiono we present a survey on the work that has
been done on securiry of MANET in the area of IDS based on
its architectures; and then we study the security of MANET
based on mobile ageirt
A. Security of MANET based on IDS Architecture
According to the systEm architecture, IDS for MANET
security can be classified as Stand-alone, Distributed ard
Cooperative and Hierarchical IDS 16l-191. For better
comparison, the details of these architectures are elabcated in
Table II.
B. Security of MANET based on Mobile Agmt
Mobile agents are intelligent and autonomous agent that can
move through heterogeneous network and interact with nodes.
For mobile agents to be useful for intrusion detection (whereas
mobile agent platform is general-purpose software that enables
organization to impleinent many different applicatiurs), it is
nec€ssary that many host and network devices are installed
with a mobile agent platform. Contast this with many
expensive IDS schernes that assume every host is installed
with a host-based IDS. This new approach (using mobile
Agent for IDS in MANET) is not unusual to install a mobile
agent in every host especially which has some features that are
veryusetul in MANET [2],14), [5], [0]-U21.
The followings are the main mobile age,nt's featues that
TABLE]
a
o
a
t
o
a
a
I
a
a
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Broad in scope
Better for detecting attacks from outside and detect
attacks that HIDS miss them
Examines packet headers & entire packet
Near real-time response
Host independent
Bandwidth dependent
No over load
Slow dorm the networks that have IDS clients installed
Detects network attacks, as payload is analyzed
Not suitable for encrypted and switches network
Does not poform normally detection of complex attacks
High frlse positive rate
Lower cost ofownership
Narow in scope, monitor specific system activates
Better for detecting attacks from inside and detect attacks that NIDS miss
frem
Does not see packet headers
Responds after a suspicious log entry
Host dependent
Bandwidth independent
Over load
Slow down the hosts that have IDS clients installed
Detects local attacks before they hit the network
Well-zuited for encrypted and switches environment
Powerful tool for analyzing a possible attack because ofrelevant
information in database
Low false positive rate
Require no additional hardware
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
o
a
a
a
o
a
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demonstrate shaight relevance to the special challenging
requirements fbund in MANET [13]:
. Conserving bandwidth
. Improving load balancing in the network
. Reducing the total tasks completion time
. Having robust and fault-tolerant behavior
. Working on a heterogeneous network
. Light-weight
These qualities make mobile agents a choice for security
framework in MANET. Table III shows the details of some
other researches on IDS, which is based on mobile agent.
IV. Ir*rnnsrRucruRE oF pRoposgD DrsrRrBttrED
FIIERARcHIcAL IDS
Our proposed solution is using distributed hierarchical IDS
for MANET. We applyHIDS for mobile devices andNIDS for
Fixed devices. A successful IDS employs both technologies(HIDS and NIDS) to provide additional effective intuJion
detection due to hierarchical architechre. For better
visualization from our IDS architecture, we divide the IDS
design for MANET with AODV+ routing protocol to two
pafts. The ftst part, which is when we have communication
between wireless nodes and wired nodes (i.e. mixed network)
and the second part, is when we have communication between
wireless nodes.
A. IDSfor Mbed Network
For this part, we apply NIDSes on gateways (which act as
base station in mixed network) to capture all the live taffic of
mixed network to develop an accurate IDS. Whenever
suspicious features occur between wireless and wired nodes,
NIDSes will detect frem. As we know, the gateway and router
are the best location to add IDS on network, because they can
monitor and capture live packet traffic on the network. By
referring to Table I we found NIDS has less overhead and it
presents better accuracy because it is broad in scope and it can
detect the attacks from outside.
B. IDSfor Wireless Nodes
When we only have communication between wireless
nodes, we apply the distributed hierarchical IDS model, which
uses several mobile agents. The disfributed hierarchical IDS
model consists of two layers, cluster member layer and cluster
head layer. A group of nodes that me close to each other is
defined as a cluster !21. We can define a node with the
highest connectivity, processing power, energJ remaining or
bandwidth capabilities to be a cluster head which has bi-
directional links to all its members within the cluster. Fig. I
shows the infrastructure overview of proposed distributed
hiermchical IDS using mobile agents.
For the sake of modularity, the task of data collection,
transmission and infusion detection and response have been
divided among different agents. The descriptions of the agerits
are as follow:
I) Mobile Data Collection Agent (MDCA): We distribute
HIDS sensors that act as host monitoring on cluster member
layer and we call them Mobile Data Collection Agent(MDCA). Each MDCA monitors and collects nomral and
abnonnal features ofeach mobile node.
TABLE II
= ==== == =o!tlF,**t 
*19t=9=s=P.!os *t"tot*tPROPOSED BY UETTTONOT,OCV AR'MTECTURI HIGHLIGHTS
\ilatchdog
&
PaJhrrte
Zlnng
Distributed &
& Lee
Coopenrtive IDS (2002)
Real-time Stamouli.
Intrusion Arryroud
D,etection Ad &
hoc network Tewari(RTDAN) (2003)
Each node runs a Sub-
IDS that detect athck
independently over DSR
protocol
Distributed
Anomaly Detection
Misuse Detection and
Speciffcation-based
Detection
Stand-alone IDS
Distributed
&
Cooperative IDS
Hierarchical
Marti
Giuli
&
Lai
(2000)
Mitigate the effects of compmmised nodes ->
Improve throughpu(+)
Detect misbehave nodes at tlre forwarding level
addition oflink level (+)
Detect Byzantine Nodes but does not report to
other nodes (-)
Strong widence => Detect locally and
independently
Weak evidence =>Detect globally and
cooperatively by voting
Anomaly detection => poor performance:> high
hlse alarm => more overhead ()
Insecure and in efficient G)
Utilize TFSM to detect real time attacks (+)
Minimize the effectiveness of attacks (+)
Has less error compare with other researches (+)
Is not complete secure sy$em (-)
a
a
a
a
o
a
a
a
(-) = Disadvantage, TFSM= timed finite state
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TABLE III
DIFFERENT PROPOSED IDS BASED ON MOBILE AGENT
PROPOSED
SYSTEM
METHODOLOGY ARCHITECTURE HIGHLIGIITS
lDS Based on
a Stgtic
Stationary
DNtsbase
(ssD)
Local
Intrusion
Detection
System
(LrDS)
D:stributed Kachirski
IDS Using &
Mobile Agent Guha
(2002)
ACooperetive Huang
IDS &
Frameuork Lee
(2003)
Mobile agent-
based Anomaly
, Misuse &
Hybrid
dete.ction
Independently
decision-making
Mobile Agent-
based
Distributed
Anomaly
delection
Indepordently
decision making
Mobile Agent-
based Anomaly
detection
lndepurdently
& Cooperatively
Cluster -based
Anomaly
detection
Indepandently
& Cooperatively
Smith
(2001)
Albers
et al.
Q002)
Two parts:
o Mobile IDS agent
. Stationary securedata
Two key elements:
r Several data
collecting agents:
o LIDS agent
o Mobile agent
o MIB agent
I A common
communication
framework
a
a
a
o
Multiple sensor
types for specific
function:
Network monitoring
Host monitoring
Decision making
Action
Special kind of
clustering algorithm
Finite State Machine
ofthe cluster-
formation protocols
Mobile agents do intrusion detection by using five
parts: ADIVI, MDM and etc.
The use of SSD limits communicalion between IDS
agents
SSD stored in high physical security arsa,but still
this is in risk ofattack (-)
Periodically up to date with non-mobile databas{)
Use SNMP data located in MIB to process data,
transmit SNMP requests to remote hosts to overcome
the unreliability of UDP, by using mobile agent (+)
Cost oflocal information collection is negligible by
running SNMP agent on eaeh node (+)
Multiple sensors used to implement a hndwidth-
conscious schgme
Distributed IDS make better network performance
(+)
Cluster-based improves the effrciency of lDS in
terms of memory usage & nefwork ov€rhead (+)
Need to prevent a compromised node be elected as
cluster head (-)
Not mention false alarm rate (-)
2) Transmission Agent (TA): After all information packets
collected from cluster memhr layer, the information is then
stored in Trace file by MDCA. We need to pass this
information to the detection €ngine on the clust€r head layer to
be used in Intrusim Detection Agent. This task is done by
Transmission Agent (TA).
3) Intrusion Detection Agent (DA): We apply Intrusion
Detection Agent (IDA) on each cluster hea4 which include a
Decision Making Agent (DMA) and Cluster Response Agent
(CRA). In fact, in *ris desigrr we use modified independent
decision-making because we have clustering algorithm with
cluster head over the network. The modified independent
decision-making is conducted when collected information
using MDCA and TA has been sent to the particular node'
which is cluster head. Then cluster head using anomaly
detection engine independently analyses and make decision on
the entire information inclusive normal and abnormal situation
(intrusion). This is a novelty of our proposed IDS in
comparison with the previous researches, which cause the low
CPU usage. An IDA is not only able to detect an intrusion, but
also can identif the possible attacker and send alarm to all
cluster memhs. Whenever the intrusion is detected, the IDA
can determine that the cluster is under attack and using CRA, a
response can be initiatd to prevent or minimize damage to the
cluster. This response can initiate alann to otler cluster
memhs.
4) Nework Response Agent (NRA): Each cluster head acts
as IDA for its cluster. After each clust€r head independently
detect and response to intusion by IDA, NRA will be
initialized and initiates exta response to all cluster member of
another cluster andeven fixed devices.
V. Sttr[wATIoN oF PRoPoSED IDS
Network Simulator Version 2 (NS2) is used as the zuitable
test bed for this project [4]. The reason of choosing NS2 as
the simulator is partly because of NS2 is an open source
application where the code can be modified and extended as
well as the range of features it provides. As Table IV shows,
the simulated network consists of 2 hosts, 2 routers, 2 gateway
and 15 mobile nodes. The topology is a flat rectangular area
with 800 met€r length and 500 meter width. The duration of
simulation is 900 seconds. Five of the 15 mobile nodes use
constant bit rate (CBR) traffic sources and they me distributed
randomly within the mobile ad hoc network.
We must consider for mixed simulation (wired-
communication-wireless), we need to use base-station
(gateway) and hierarchical routing in order to rout packets
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Pause Time 5s
Maximum Speed 0.1- l0 m/s
-_
m = meter, CBR= constant bit rate, s=second.
between wireless and wired domains. In this scenario we
divide the task of gateway recovery and routing between 2
prepared gateways and 2 hosts. We define two clusters namely,
cluster A and cluster B. Cluster A consists of 8 mobile nodes.
in which 3 ofthem are consider as souraes.
Fig. l. tntastructure Overview of proposed Distributed Hierarchical IDS
In a portion of simulation time traffic flooding attack (a kind of
Denial ofService attack) are presented by one ofthe sources.
Cluster B also consist of 7 mobile nodes, in which 2 of them
are consider as sources. In a portion of simulation time, the
TABLEIV
CoMMoN PARAMETERS IN SIMTJLATIoN
NETWORK PARAMETER VALUE
attack is presented by one of the sources. We choose starting
time of sending data packets uniformly within the first l0
seconds of the simulation till one second before the end of the
simulation. We apply the AODV+ routing protocol in reactive
mode of gateway recovery. Screenshot of the simulation
scenario using NAM window is shown in Fig. 2 The two
hexagonal nodes are the gateways and the four square nodes
are the two host and the two routers.
VI. TEsraNo Rnsur_rs
A. Test
We test our distributed hierarchical IDS based on two
criteria: CPU usage and detection rate accuracy (based on
number of attacks). For better understanding, we nd to
explain the testing part based on NS2 scenario in cluster A
(same scenario for cluster B) and show the results in Fig. 3.
The test parameters are based on the topology of our simulated
network, which are presented in Table IV. We must consider
these parameters are just sample values md they can be
flexible.
We run our simulated MANET topology through AODV+
routing protocol, in where the source nodes ganerating normal
packets using CBR generator (with 0.5 interval time or send
rate of2 packets/s and packet size 512 bye). Then one ofthe
source that performs as an attacker (node Number 8 in cluster
A and 14 in cluster B) fries to send abnormal packets to its
target. We generate taffic flooding attack" which is a kind of
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack using CBR generator (with
0.25 interval time or send rate of 4 packets/s and packet
size1000 byes and 600 bytes). Again sources will continue to
send normal packet to all cluster members and fixed hosts.
It should be noted that we generate different packet size
with different interval time to distinguish betweeir normal and
abnormal packets. For inshnce, drning the DoS attack, the
flood is also CBR over UDP, but for better viewing of DoS
traffic flooding attack and its force on high usage of network
resources, we choose high sard rate and big packet size
compare with the norrnal packet size (512 byte) and nrrnal
ssnd rate (2 packets/s).
For mixed networlq NDS on each node capture all the traffic
and can easily detect abnormal packets. In the wireless nodes,
which we applied distributed hierarchical IDS (also by
applyng different agents and with their cooperatiur), we can
detect the attacks and identifvthe attacker.
B. Results
Based on the detection results, we can find number and
duration of attacks. In addition, we can idurtify the attacker.
Detection rate in simulation environment for our designed IDS
is I 00% and the number of attacks does not affect the accuracy
of IDS. In addition accuracy, there is other measurement to
evaluate the performance of distributed hierarchical IDS. This
measurement is CPU usage. As we know for the sake of
modularity, the task of tDS is divided among different agents.
Topology Size
Number of Mobile Nodes
Number of sources
Number of gateway
Traffic Type
Packet Rate
Packet Size
Simulation Time
Transmission range
800mx 500m
l5
5
CBR
|,2,4 packetVs
5 12 ,600,1000 byte
900
250 m
Mobile Node Host
(Fixed Node)
Gateway Rouier Source
(Mobite Node)
Fig.2. A Screenshot ofthe Simulation Scenario
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When IDS is running, each agent uses some amount of CPU
resource.
We compared our distributed hierarchical IDS (when we
have modified independant decision-making by cluster head)
with previous researches (which applied independent and
collaborated decision making per node) in case of CPU usage.
We found the total CPU usage for IDS is due to several
factors such as cluster head formation, running MDCA, TA,
IDS and NRA. Total CPU usage of distributed hierarchical
IDS (4.65%) is reduced in comparison with the distibuted and
cooperative IDS (6.00%). Fig. 3 shows, even under a htgh
number of attacks, the CPU usage of distibuted hierarchical
IDS is still less than distributed IDS. Considering the
significant performance from CPU usage based on number of
attack, it is clear that overall, distibuted hierarchical IDS is a
far better approach than the distibuted IDS for MANET.
VII. ANALYSIS
A distributed hierarchical IDS, c,ombining MDCA, TA,
for ideal and accurate IDS based on mobile agent, clustering
and distributed hierarchical IDS for wireless mobile ad hoc
network. The result shows that we are successful in proposing
some enhancement in case of efficiency of IDS in term of
accuracy and CPU usage and confidently we exhibit the
development of security in wireless mobile ad hoc networks.
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Fig. 3. CPU Usage vs. Numbet of Attacks
DMA, CRA andNI{A, for MANET based on AODV+ routing
protocol is the proposed in this research. The systern not only
has a higher overall detection rate and as a result higlt accuacy
(100%), but also lessened the CPU usage (4.65%). Our
experiment results showed thaL even when we have the
highest number ofattacks, the level ofdetection and as a result
the accuracy of our proposed IDS is stable at l00oh , while
reduces CPU utilization by 1.35%.
This accuracy is the result of anomaly detection and
response, which is mtre powerflil in compare with misuse
detection. Some important factors for resource constained
equipment are overhead and CPU usage. The distributed
hierarchical IDS has low CPU usage, v/hich is the result of
mobile agent and cluster-based intrusion detection.
VIII. CoNct uuor.t
The main objective of this research was to design and
implemant of efficient distributed hierarchical IDS using
mobile ag€nt over a MANET that has connection to the
lnternet by AODV+, and study the effect of the proposed IDS
in case of accuracy and CPU usage. The outcome of the
research should be the first IDS framework designed for
AODV+ routing protocol.
In conclusim, the result dernonstrate some improvernent
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